Damascius on the One and the Ineffable

Abstract

Damascius was the last scholarch of the School of Athens. He is doubtless the most original thinker of late-ancient Platonism. The aporetic nature of his philosophy is a consequence of his constant discontent with the Proclean systematization of the late Platonic doctrine. The present article discusses Damascius’ theory of the One and the Ineffable (τὸ ἄρρητον). Damascius introduces a strict distinction between the Ineffable and the One, thus reacting against Proclus’ attempt to combine the One and the Ineffable. The One is posed by Damascius as the first, genuine cause of all things, whereas the Ineffable is absolutely transcendent and has no causal relation. The One must produce all things since it contains them beforehand in an unitary way, i.e., without any differentiation, and at the subsequent levels of reality, the totality of all things becomes gradually developed from this initial unity. In the most elaborate terminology, Damascius calls the supreme One ‘the One-All’ (τὸ ἓν πάντα). In contrast to Proclus, Damascius argues for the acceptance of an ineffable principle beyond the One. The Ineffable is absolutely detached from all things and escapes all notional determination. Thus, it cannot properly be called a principle. In an effort to express its radical transcendence, Damascius refuses to emphasize the positive role of his ineffable ‘principle’ in the constitution of the universe.