სოციალური სამართლიანობა დუნს სკოტის ნებითი რაციონალობის ჭრილში

ანოტაცია

The aim of the article is to demonstrate the basis of social justice in the frame of Duns Scotus' theory of rationality. The first part of the text displays how the medieval philosopher understands rationality. Contrary to the widespread view, which identifies rationality as responding correctly to reasons, Scotus considers that rational ability implies free will. The intellect manifests truth and directs the will, but the latter can disagree with it. What differentiates rational ability from irrational ones is its self-determinacy and free relation towards its objects. Because of this feature, rational individuals are capable of being not only passive recipients of their nature and the general natural order but also active creators of their free volitional relations towards beings (including themselves). Even though Scotus was more interested in metaphysical topics and did not say much about social themes, it is possible to transfer his rational theory into some notable remarks on social justice. Society and social justice are the results of rationality and depend on the quality of its flourishing. Because of this, it is reasonable to expect the social structure to encourage actualising rational ability as fully as possible. Following this idea, in the second part of the article, an interpretation is proposed: any justification of social inequality based on natural features (ethnicity, gender, physical or intellectual abilities, etc.) inappropriately restricts rational ability and equates it with irrational ones. If rationality implies free will, then all rational individuals are equal in their fundamental capacity to make choices and shape their relationships, regardless of their different irrational abilities (including those related to the intellect, which is also irrational for Scotus).